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[Abstract] Why do some children voluntarily join while other children are forced to join 
military organization in situations of conﬂict, and why do the organizations recruit them? 
How is the actual number of children determined? These are the questions raised in this 
paper. To address them the author draws on results and ideas from three independent lines 
of research; One dealing with child labour in general, another with the study of conﬂicts and 
the third with children’s decision-making powers based on child psychology.
Jens Chr. Andvig
Child soldiers: Reasons for 
variation in their rate of recruitment and 
standards of welfare
   
Table of Contents 
 
 
1. Child labour and conflicts........................................................................... 7 
 
2. Numbers and data sources .......................................................................... 8 
 
3. Child soldiers defined............................................................................... 12 
4.  Supply and demand for child soldiers in the long run. Rural  
background factors ................................................................................. 13 
 
5.  The wide variation in child/adult participation rates: Measuring  
error or a significant research issue? ...................................................... 16 
 
6. ‘Supply’ of child soldiers in the short run ................................................ 19 
 
7. Violent organizations tactical aims and their demand for children .......... 25 
 
8. Greed vs. grievance motivation and the welfare of child soldiers............ 27 
 
9. The market for child soldiering and the child soldier ratio....................... 34 
 
10. Child soldiering and child capabilities ................................................... 37 
 
References .................................................................................................... 41 

1. Child labour and conflicts 
That young children today are engaged in organized killing of other children 
and adults in a significant number of countries, is one of the most ethically 
revolting facts about the world day, or so would, I believe, be the prevailing 
public opinion in most developed countries. Unlike the attitude to many 
other forms of child labour that opinion appears to be globally shared. Oth-
erwise it would be difficult to explain why not more children would partici-
pate actively in violent, large scale conflicts. 
It may not be so obvious that severe violence performed and suffered by 
children should be considered as a separate and more ethically worrisome 
issue than if performed and suffered by adults, it is clearly perceived as such. 
Like global terrorism it has become a global issue because of the feelings it 
awakes, not its quantitative significance. The feelings it awakes are mostly 
feelings of compassion, not fear or revenge as in the terrorism case, and the 
activities it activates are mostly humanitarian, not military or destructive. 
Nevertheless, here I will mainly set the ethics issues – including the ethics of 
adult-versus-child – aside, and ask a number of questions about what deter-
mine the mix of children and adults that violent organizations1 apply; at bot-
tom also questions about quantitative significance.  
A child soldier is defined here as a child who participate actively in a vio-
lent conflict by being member of an organization that applies violence in a 
systematic way. The definition hinges, of course, on what is meant by a 
child. The basic idea of the article is to explore questions that arise when we 
connect two different, but rapidly increasing research fields: the study of 
violent conflicts and children’s labour. To the degree the phenomenon of 
child soldiers have been exposed to social science research at all, they have 
so far mainly been analysed within the child labour tradition. A study of 
child labour in general mainly may contribute to the understanding of the 
supply side of child soldiering, however. To understand the demand side, we 
would have to look more closely into civil wars and the behaviour of violent 
organizations. As I will later argue, in most cases it is reasonable to assume 
that it is the demand side that determines the actual number of children who 
are asked to kill.  
Since violent organizations often use force when recruiting children, the 
notions of supply and demand may be misleading, but I will discuss ele-
ments that decide how easy it is to catch child versus adult recruits as a kind 
of ‘supply’ characteristic. It is the characteristics of children, however, that 
decide how useful they (compared to adults) may become for the violent or-
ganizations themselves.  
Evidence suggests that that not only the number of child soldiers is de-
termined from the violent organizations’ side, but also the child welfare may 
vary systematically with the kind of organization they participate in. For ex-
ample, profit-oriented violent organizations appear on average to be more 
harmful.2 The moral panic the phenomenon of child soldiers has given rise 
                                                     
1 By a violent organization I will mean an organization that applies fairly large scale (at a 
company level or above) violent actions regularly either as aim or instrument. Both rebel, 
government military and large-scale crime organizations belong to this category, but the 
focus in this paper will be on rebel organizations since  
2 In the literature on civil wars the terms ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ are mainly used about 
different sets of causes of war. Greed is focused on economic factors that make it possible 
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to, may have overshadowed perception and analysis of the variation in the 
welfare of the children involved.  
The aim in the following is to explore some questions that naturally arise 
when the three streams of knowledge meet: 1) What we know about the 
relevant capabilities in general of children in general; 2) what we know 
about the extent, the causes and consequences of children participating in 
economic activities (child labour); 3) what we know about the wars (or 
criminal activities) where children get engaged, the participating organiza-
tions and their behaviour. How may elements from these three strands of 
research be combined in order to supply plausible explanations of child sol-
dier phenomena and their quantitative distribution across conflicts? The am-
bition is neither to present any new data – not even seriously research the 
quality of the existing one –, nor to formulate and test any specific, new em-
pirical hypotheses about the cause of child soldiering.  
In the following I will give the so-called child soldier ratio considerable 
attention that is the number of child soldiers in a violent organization divided 
by its total number of soldiers. One reason for the attention is simply that the 
ratio has played an important role for the guess-mates of the number of child 
soldiers in several conflicts. The ratio also concentrates many of the social 
and economic effects likely to have impact on the use of children in violent 
conflicts. Finally it is in focus in the only attempt I am aware of to explain 
the use of child soldiers quantitatively, Reich and Achvarina (2004)  
I would like to underline that this paper is an explorative one with a num-
ber of preliminary observations that may prove incorrect and conclusions 
that may prove wrong. It is an attempt, however, to make sense out of a 
number of disjointed observations and judgments made by people who have 
had more first-hand experience of this revolting phenomenon we may ob-
serve in some modern societies. 
2. Numbers and data sources 
Like many other phenomena that have given rise to international concern, 
child soldiering has received its global number. It has until recently been 300 
000; that is, the standard estimate of the total number of child soldiers in the 
world has until recently been 300 000. This number has partly disappeared, 
partly been scaled down to something around 100 000.3 Despite several 
                                                     
to finance rebel organizations and give them some chances to win military contests. 
Grievance is focused on political factors and forms of economic unfairness as explanatory 
mechanisms. In the following, however, wars of greed or grievance will mean wars where 
the major competitors are either consciously profit-oriented or oriented towards achieving 
some collective good for non-members, that is, have to rely on some forms of altruism. 
Hence, a grievance organization may be explained by ‘greed’. When looking at an organi-
zation greed or grievance is not something that works behind the backs of the agents. 
While one may agree with Collier and Hoeffler (2002) that the ‘greed’ complex has better 
explanatory power statistically, grievance as well as greed organizations exist and often 
behave in a different manner. This difference may make a significant difference for the 
welfare of the child soldiers as well as for the civil population. However, one may wonder 
about the theoretical explanatory power of ‘greed’ causes if a ‘greed ‘war is fought by 
grievance organizations? That does not matter much in the following, since I will focus on 
the consequences of the war for the children who get involved in the fighting, not the 
causes of war. Recently the distinction has went out of fashion, but still it appears to re-
flect some reality, at least when it concerns the outcomes for children. 
3 This number is my reading of Coalition to stop the use of child soldiers (2004). The read-
justment downwards is combined with an increased emphasis on the uncertainty of the es-
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weaknesses, this number is based on more careful counting. The exact num-
ber is not so important at this stage of the exploration, however.  
At one hand it tells that a significant number of children has gone through 
and still may go through experiences and participate in activities they should 
not be burdened with according to most normative views of childhood. At 
the other hand, the number of child soldiers is surprisingly modest given the 
fact that the areas where most of the violent conflicts are going on, are char-
acterized by their children participating in adult economic activities from an 
early age.  
This is partly reflected in the corresponding global NGO aggregates for 
child labour. The propaganda estimate for the number of working children is 
250 million. The number of child soldiers is also modest compared to the 
estimate of the total number of children engaged in so-called ‘worst forms of 
child labour’ of which child soldiering forms a part, 50 million, where 5.7 
million are working under ‘horrific’ circumstances. The basic reason why 
the number of child soldiers is so low may be that a norm about soldiering as 
incompatible with childhood is surprisingly widely shared. This is in contrast 
to the international distribution of actually held norms about child labour in 
general where normative views often differ sharply. Even if we only com-
pare the number of child soldiers to the number of children in the conflict 
countries we will find low participation rates in most areas.4 The low par-
ticipation rate makes it also difficult even under the best of circumstances to 
get representative samples of active child soldiers (Pedersen, 2004).  
Even as an indicator of child suffering during conflicts, the suffering in-
dicated by an average stock of 100 000 (or 300 000 for that matter) child 
soldiers for the 2001 – 2004 period appears modest compared to the yearly 
flow of 200 000 children who have been ascribed as killed due to violent 
conflicts during the last decade.5 While the statistical basis for most of these 
aggregate numbers is weak, the international humanitarian organizations are 
the ones that have been engaged with the issues more often and more sys-
tematically than anyone else, and thus they may have evolved a rough ‘feel’ 
for their relative numbers. 
If we look more closely at the different country estimates of the number 
of child soldiers, it is clear that they cannot meaningfully be aggregated: 
                                                     
timated numbers. If a real decrease has taken place, it is partly due to peace settlements in 
some wars where extensive use of children occurred (such as the war in Sierra Leone), 
partly to more sober and better researched numbers for each country, and possibly also 
due to increased international pressure on the violent organizations (Humpreys and 
Weinstein, 2004). Global estimates will be heavy influenced by the number of children 
estimated for the Burmese army. 
4 The participation rate most commonly discussed is the fraction of children in the violent 
groups. This may be quite high, as we will see, but most violent organizations are quite 
small compared to the total population in which they operate so the rate of child soldier to 
the number of children in the relevant age cohorts becomes low. 
5 All the numbers referred to above are collected at the Global March web page, but they 
may be found almost everywhere. With the possible exception of the death estimate, these 
numbers are quite speculative and based upon rough assessments made by international 
public organisations or NGOs. The fact that global numbers often stay unchanged even if 
the organisation in charge makes new studies that changes the estimates for important 
components on which the global aggregate presumably is based, reflects their symbolic, 
propagandist nature. It is worth noting that the latest official survey published by the Coa-
lition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (November 2004) does not present any aggregate 
numbers at all, but only gives country estimates and refers to the fact that the use of chil-
dren in armed conflicts have been reported for more than 20 countries in the periods April 
2001 till March 2004. 
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Some reports refer to the stock of children who are ‘employed’ by a violent 
organisation at a given point of time, others try to catch the aggregate flow 
of children who have been employed during a given period, some may give 
the highest stocks experienced in period considered, some may even add the 
stock of children observed at different points of time, and so on. The last 
way to count is, of course, unacceptable. The stock of children is mainly use-
ful for analysing the role of the children in the violent organisations or the 
role of violent organisation in the child labour markets.  
For judging the effects on child welfare, and for studying the share of 
children in recruitment processes of the violent organisations, cumulated 
flows are more relevant. There are several reasons for this judgment: The 
harmful effects on the children of having participated in armed conflicts are 
probably long-lasting. Hence it is the number of children who has gone 
through the experience that should count when considering these effects. 
Secondly, the death rate in battles among children is likely to be different, so 
behind a stock of child soldiers, a larger (or smaller, if they are protected by 
adult commanders and soldiers against the most risky assignments) number 
of children has been recruited compared to adults. There is also reason to 
expect different desertion rates, reinforcing the argument that the cumulative 
flow is a better measure. 
In practice, we have no good estimates of either, so when it comes to 
quantitative assessments of the number child soldiers we have to rely on a) 
rather loose impressions made by experts who combine rough assessments 
of the size of the violent organization combined with a few observations of 
the age distributions of units observers have happened to gain access and b) 
more or less systematic surveys made mainly from demobilisation and at-
tempted reintegration processes. 
Data collected in the last situation is, of course, extremely sensitive 
where honest answers about whether you have been a child soldier or not, 
rarely can be expected. While promising anonymity, the respondents have 
few reasons to trust the claim. In most cases the likelihood of renewal of the 
war is quite high, and considered as such by the respondents. Depending on 
the exact circumstances, an honest answer may risk your life, a re-
recruitment into a violent organization, a long jail sentence or make you miss 
the demobilisation and reintegration support sometimes provided by interna-
tional donors.6 The information is also likely to be strongly skewed in the 
direction of areas and conflicts where international organisations are more 
strongly involved.7 Nevertheless, it is here we are likely to get more satisfac-
tory data. So far, to my knowledge individual level data of satisfactory qual-
ity exist for Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka, and may be developed for Liberia 
and North Uganda. 
                                                     
6 Psychologists and psychiatrists have, however, been in position to make statistical studies 
of the psychological effects of child soldier experience cf., for example, Derluyn et al 
(2004) and Dyregrov et al (2002). These effects are, however, not the main focus of this 
paper.  
7 The possible impact of the activities of international organizations on data availability is 
highlighted by the recent study of Reich and Achvarina (2004), where they find the major 
explanatory factor in determining the fraction of children in the total population of sol-
diers in African civil war to be the degree of protection against military intrusion of the 
refugee camps in the area. While the refugee camps certainly are important, the events 
connected to the camps are also likely to be better covered in the available child soldier 
statistics, making it easy to overstate their empirical importance.  
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Qualitative information about mechanisms of recruitment, treatment and 
behaviour of children is more plentiful. Again, most of the information has 
been collected in connection with the international donor organisations’ ef-
forts to assist in the demobilisation and reintegration of child combatants. 
While qualitative and therefore often considered anecdotal, they vary much 
in their levels of precision. Here it is impossible to avoid subjective judg-
ments that may prove wrong. I have in the following tried to rely only on 
reports that appear based on fairly sharp observations, not normative con-
formist presuppositions. A few studies have their empirical basis in Western 
soldiers’ battlefield experience when fighting children (Singer, 2001–2002, 
and Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, 2002). While not sys-
tematic, they bring forward actual experience about child soldiers that is not 
otherwise available. 
An additional source of information that is potentially relevant for the 
understanding of the supply mechanisms of child soldiers is the increasing 
number of household surveys in poor countries that also include some in-
formation about the labour of the children. In principle, employment as a 
soldier may be considered one form of child labour. The advantage of this 
source of information is that it is more systematic and somewhat less riddled 
by the problem of eliciting honest answers than the direct child soldier data. 
The information about the large sub-group of children that neither work nor 
go to school in many poor countries according to these studies is likely to be 
of particular interest (see Biggeri et al, 2003).  
A key question that arises when explaining the use of child soldiers of 
different age groups is to determine whether and in what ways their deci-
sion-making capabilities are different from the adults’. In addition to child 
labour data I will here report on studies of children’s decisions and cognitive 
behaviour in different experiments published in a series of papers at the De-
partment of Economics, University of Oregon (cf. Harbaugh et al, 2004). 
While there obvious problems with transferring data collected this way to 
real world situations in general and child soldier behaviour in particular, 
where both strong emotions and group processes are likely to be heavily in-
volved, correctives to the very emotionally charged and frequently uncon-
vincing descriptions of child behaviour in war-like conditions are needed. 
As mentioned above, no really statistically reliable data about child sol-
diers exist. I have tried to avoid the purely anecdotal descriptions, however, 
and stick to observations reported in studies clearly aimed to analyse and 
describe facts. The facts are mainly of three types: 1) Interviews made by 
international observers who have had got access to some units of some vio-
lent organization. These interviews are of varying quality and have mostly 
humanitarian aims in mind. The best reports contain for the most part quali-
tative information about the conditions and thinking of the child soldiers. 2) 
Less impressionistic data have been collected from a number of Central Af-
rican countries (ILO/IPEC 2003) where a number of child soldiers from des-
ignated areas have been chosen to be interviewed in some systematic way 
(but not by random sampling) and their characteristics and environments are 
compared to similarly chosen ex-child soldiers and never-participating chil-
dren. Whether the recorded differences are statistically valid or not are im-
possible to determine, but they are suggestive and useful for the construction 
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of (possibly) realistic theories. 3) Data from demobilisation processes. Here 
extensive surveys have been made for some countries, such as the ones from 
Sierra Leone (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004) and Mozambique 
(Weinstein, 2005) where the demographic information also sheds light on 
the population of child soldiers. From data about date of recruitment and age 
at demobilisation, estimates about child soldier ratios may be made, but seri-
ous sources of misrepresentation persists: The ex-combatants who join the 
official demobilisation are likely to differ from the ones who don’t join in 
systematic ways, and the incentives to lie about age and date of recruitment 
are likely to be strong. 
3. Child soldiers defined 
The focus of the paper is the actual employment of children in violent or-
ganizations under war-like conditions. This gives the basis for the definitions 
of child soldiers applied here. Several will be presented. Whether the chil-
dren are engaged in the purely military activities of these organizations or 
not is of secondary importance. An underlying question is why such organi-
zations recruit children, that is, employ individuals before their technical and 
decision-making capabilities are fully developed and before their preferences 
are fixed. A definition of what a child is should ideally be given. 
Age definitions The standard definition of a child soldier is the one for-
mulated by UNICEF: “A child soldier” is any child – boy or girl – under 18 
years of age, who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or 
armed group in any capacity, including, but not limited to: cooks, porters, 
messengers, and anyone accompanying such groups other than family mem-
bers.”8 This definition is operational and is the basis for most of the statistics 
that has been published in the area. Other age limits might have become 
equally operational, however, and to define a child as a person being below 
15 years old may be closer to what most have in mind when thinking about 
have in mind. 
Cultural definitions Shepler (2004) and other social anthropologists have 
insisted that a child and hence also a child soldier is a social construct, and 
should be defined differently in different societies. Persons in their early 30s 
may then become children for some purposes. For our comparative questions 
it is obviously difficult to stick to a definition of that kind here, however. 
Psychological definitions should in principle be based upon the develop-
ment of children’s task-solving and decision-making capabilities as they de-
velop with age. One attempt would be to define a child as any person who is 
undergoing fairly fast increase in task-solving abilities and predictable 
changes in broad preferences due to young age. 
Economic definitions would focus on the ability of a person to accom-
plish economic tasks. If the unskilled labour input of a person only may 
cause net negative product due to low age, this person is certainly a child in 
the economic sense. This is certainly too restrictive and few children would 
be involved in economic activities and few would become soldiers if this 
                                                     
8 This definition was adopted as part of the so-called “Cape Town principles” at a child 
soldier conference in South Africa in 1997 (Coalition to stop the use of child soldiers, 
2003: 14). 
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was the only case – except for learning and systematic changes in prefer-
ences.9 Somewhat less restrictive we may consider unskilled labour input as 
characterized by children if it only yields positive net output in most task 
assignments if combined with an adult’s (is a complementary factor). Only 
in a few task assignments may they substitute for adults.10 The reason for 
this observation is probably that adult management is normally needed in 
order to assure child task completions. In the context of violent organizations 
this would translate to a hypothesis that the employment of a child would 
only result in a higher probability to win the contest if its efforts were com-
bined with complementary adult input.  
– Neither the psychological nor the economic definitions that both are 
rather tailor-made to the individual capabilities of the person in question, are 
hardly operational 
The ‘favela’ definition11 is, however, both tailor-made to the individual 
child in question and operational in principle. It is based on thorough screen-
ing of potential child recruit the violent drug gangs in Rio have been able to 
perform – sharing the street with the children of the favela before a new 
child is recruited. A child according to this definition is any person too 
young to handle guns and contracts. That is, the gangs are not recruiting any 
children. The age when a child ends being a child, naturally varies with indi-
vidual maturity, but most are recruited within the ages 12 to 14. This is also 
the age when children appear able to make individual decisions about  
migration (Iversen, 2002, 2005). It is reasonable to assume that it is first 
at this age around early puberty that children become employed by violent 
organizations in any scale. Hence it may be more appropriate in quantitative 
terms to discuss child soldiering as an issue related to early adolescence than 
a child issue proper.12 
4. Supply and demand for child soldiers in the long run. 
Rural background factors 
Clausewitz once wrote that ‘war is nothing but a continuation of political 
intercourse with the admixture of different means’ (Clausewitz, 1976: 605). 
One could add social and economic intercourse. The war where children 
have become active soldiers is the typical war of today – ‘a stalemated guer-
rilla war confined to a rural periphery of a low-income, post-colonial state’ 
                                                     
9 Note that this may be the normal situation for the very young children. It is a separate 
issue how to explain why so young children may be demanded also by violent organiza-
tions although their may reduce their immediate fighting. It is often these very young 
children the public may have in mind when considering child soldiering as an ethical is-
sue. I will not analyse it here, however. 
10 Estimating the children children’s contributions within in a set of economic household 
models, they appear to be complementary factor even in situations where one expect sub-
stitution effects to dominate, such as when the arrival of a girl foster child cause the adult, 
female labour input to increase (cf. Ainsworth, 1996) 
11 This definition is based on Dowdney’s (2003: 125) description of a local gang’s screening 
of potential recruits. While less sophisticate a number of violent organization would not 
employ a child if it is not able at its first try is able to follow the group, carrying a heavy 
load. According to its level of brutality, it may either kill it or leave it behind.  
12 In the one case where one has a fairly precise age distribution of the child soldiers (of 
Sierra Leone as described in Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004), but only an imprecise sta-
tistical recording (ibid. figure 1, p. 14) it appears that about 1/3 of the child soldiers were 
below 15,and ½ 15 and below. The 15years old group was exceptionally large, maybe due 
to the ease of remembering that age.  
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(Fearon, 2005). These are also areas where children are engaged in all kinds 
of adult economic activities – where they exist. In sub-Saharan Africa, the 
more rural a country is, the higher the child labour participation rates tend to 
be, as shown in the following figure:  
 
 
Figure 0.Child labour participation rates and the rural population 
share, some African states 
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Following this observation we should expect that the more children are in-
volved in ordinary economic activities, the more likely they are to be en-
gaged by a violent organization operating in the same area. For example, if 
children do a large share of the transport back and forth to the fields13, they 
are more likely to be asked or ordered to carry food and weapons for a vio-
lent organization if that kind of organization arises in the neighbourhood. 
Child labour supply creates its own demand in the sense that the command-
ers of the violent organizations would rely on their own experience of the 
tasks children may accomplish in family contexts when recruiting them to 
their organization. Moreover, the organization itself will reflect some tradi-
tional ways of task allocation: The ways to cook, to get hold on water, to 
seek shelter, and so on. The more ‘traditional’ a violent organization does its 
activities, the more easily it may suck up children. Since girls are heavily 
involved in child labour of this kind – at least in an African context, we 
                                                     
13 In a very detailed study of the children’s economic activities in a traditional rural area of 
Zimbabwe Reynolds (1991: 55) documented that the children carried 40% of the harvest 
back home.  
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might expect the share of girls due to this mechanism to be even higher than 
for boys. 
The number of girls is nevertheless lower in all known conflicts. Other 
structural features of the rural neighbourhoods may supply parts of the ex-
planation. Reynolds (1991: 121) points to one structural possibility – boys 
have traditionally been encouraged to move and travel more than girls both 
for pleasure, for seeking patrons and keeping family networks alive. Violent 
organizations in general and rebel organizations in particular need to be mo-
bile, to ‘travel’. Hence, we may expect it might be easier for boys to join 
them from a traditional point of view and military commanders are natural 
patrons in times of war. Moreover, the violent activities themselves are po-
tentially more appealing and easier to accommodate to the traditional roles 
of boys, of course. So the large share of boys may not be so surprising after 
all, even when we only look at mechanisms rooted in traditional rural envi-
ronments.  
I have argued that that the high general child economic participation rates 
in poor rural areas should make it ‘natural’ for the violent organizations op-
erating in the same areas also to make extensive use of children too. Looking 
at these background features, could modern violent organizations rely di-
rectly on established traditions to recruit children, or is this a new develop-
ment? In an African context this is disputed. Relying on a mixed set of evi-
dence but emphasizing the Zulu organization for warfare, which has been 
carefully studied, Bennett (1998) denies it. He argues, for example, that chil-
dren were neither physically strong enough nor sufficiently well trained to 
engage in the kind of warfare that the Zulus engaged in. His view is sup-
ported by Twum-Danso (2003). The implication is that the employment of 
children in warfare is a fairly recent development probably connected to the 
use of light and easy to use modern hand weapons. This is in any case 
mostly working from the demand side. The possible prestige and power 
youth and children may get access if they get access to weapon they are able 
to handle is mainly working through the supply side, however so the weapon 
characteristics may also have impact here.  
Based on detailed observations from several long field stays, Shepler 
(2004) documents, however, how many of the specific ways children are 
employed in the violent organizations of present-day Sierra Leone can be 
traced back to traditional age group organizations, West African child foster-
age traditions, secret societies, and so on. Moreover, she demonstrates that 
much of the killings performed by the children have been performed by ma-
chetes and other traditional weapons. Her presentation gives the most de-
tailed description of how established social and economic forms may have 
impact on the violent organizations and generate prescriptions for how much 
and how children could be used.  
In what sense may the established characteristics of the rural societies in 
which the violent organizations move explain the use of child soldiers? 
Firstly, as we have defined child soldiers, a conflict is presupposed.14 The 
fact that violent organizations mostly operate in rural neighbourhoods, does 
not imply that the more rural a country is, the more conflict prone it will be. 
                                                     
14 Seen from a normative point of view its paradoxical (and revolting) that children in most 
cases are accepted by military organizations when actual killing is on the agenda. 
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We may not expect any clear quantitative pattern to be determined, making 
the number of child soldiers a direct, positive function of child labour in 
general.15  
What the extensive economic participation of children in rural areas do 
explain in the wide sense, however, is that children are more likely to be-
come objects of choice, potential recruits for military commanders, when the 
latter from their own experience are used to see children do the household 
and farming tasks. This is reinforced by the tendency of the violent organiza-
tions to copy many of the aspects of the dominant way to organize economic 
activities in their neighbourhoods, family-types of organization. The most 
visible manifestation of the copying of family-based organization is a ten-
dency of the male commanders (and often also soldiers) to acquire “wives” 
in many of the conflicts, but not all.16  
While we in the following are going to look at forces of demand and sup-
ply as crucial in determining the number and age composition of the armed 
forces operating in an area, demand specified for a given set of violent or-
ganizations, it is obvious that these organizations themselves are endogenous 
to the characteristics of these area. That, is most of the factors that may de-
termine the short run supply of child soldiers, may cause the long run de-
mand. Without a conflict of the Fearon-type, (almost) no child soldiers 
would emerge. 
If we look at the whole class of countries, we are likely to find the same 
factors that determine the probability of a conflict occurring, such as GDP 
per capita, will also influence the occurrence and number of child soldiers. 
Given that a conflict has occurred and a number of violent organization 
arisen, we may believe that the resulting short run demand may reflect quite 
different forces than supply. 
5. The wide variation in child/adult participation rates: 
Measuring error or a significant research issue? 
But given that a conflict has occurred, what will determine the child partici-
pation rate in the violent organizations? If we are going to be able to explain 
the actual number of child soldiers in any given conflict, we would need 
more specific mechanisms. The dramatic variation in child/adult soldier ra-
tios even for a number of African conflicts all taking place in countries 
                                                     
15 We will later study the connections between farm labour and soldiering for children living 
in conflict areas. I suspect that the most important empirical result from the child labour 
reports are the estimates for the share of children who are ’neither in school nor perform-
ing economic activity’. Alas, we don’t have numbers here for any conflict country, but 
child unemployment is clearly a serious issue for at least many African countries. In 
Cameroon, for example, more than 25% of children are ‘idle’ (Biggeri et al (2003): 4).  
16 The outcome of this practice is frequently very harmful to the young women or girls who 
often are abducted by force and exposed to various forms of sexual violence. The effects 
of society-wide norms that allow or prescribes early sexual unions get perverted when 
embedded in organizations tha rely on force. Forced recruitment of girls may cause an in-
crease in the voluntary supply of boys, however, particularly in many of the African coun-
tries where the traditional marriage ‘markets’ have broken down often due to increased 
scarcity of land, This illustrates how the surrounding social and economic institutions 
have impact on the forms of violence – and maybe also in this case contributes as a cause. 
In this article I have chosen not to analyse the gender aspects of the supply and demand 
for child soldiers systematically, however. 
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dominated by poor, rural populations is reflected in the following table (bor-
rowed from Reich and Achvarina (2005: 16)17 : 
 
Table 1: Child soldier participation in some African conflicts 
 
Country and conflict Number of combatants Number of child soldiers Child soldier ratio 
Angola (1975–94) 194,000  8,000  4 % 
Burundi (1992–93)  50,000  5,000  10 % 
Uganda (1994–2002)  74,000  16,000  22 % 
Sierra Leone(1991–2000)  45,000  10,000  22 % 
Rwanda (1990–1995)  70,000  17,500  25 % 
Angola (1996–2002)   72,500  20,000  28 % 
DRC (1996–2001)  72,000  20,000  28 % 
Mozambique (1976–92)18  92,900  25,500  28 % 
Liberia (1989–95)  60,000  17,500  29 % 
Burundi (1995–99)  45,000  14,000  31 % 
Sudan (1993–2002)  40,000  15,700  39 % 
Liberia (2000–02)  40,000  21,000  53 % 
 
Reinforcing the impression of a wide variation in the child soldier ratios 
seven conflicts took place without any registered child soldiers at all (in 
Senegal, Mali, Lesotho, Niger and the Central African Republic), according 
to Reich and Achvarina (2004). 19 How may such large variation be ex-
plained?20 It is obvious that the child participation rate would have to be 
studied together with adult participation rate. 
An obvious explanation is that measuring errors are likely to be large and 
frequent, and the participation rate is a fraction of two numbers both with 
large margins of error. For example, if the margins of error are 10 000 chil-
dren when we believe the total number to be 16 000 (Uganda) and the total 
error for all soldiers to be 10%, then the participation rate for Uganda may 
vary between about 7.5% and 40%. To explore this possibility further we 
would go deeply into the empirical work foundation of the child soldier sta-
tistics. Here this work will be postponed for a later paper. Here I will focus 
more on theoretical possibilities.  
                                                     
17 I have made some minor changes due to a printing error in the original 
18 Weinstein (2005: 613) mentions 27.4% child soldiers in Mozambique (23.3% in the gov-
ernment forces and 40.7% for Renamo).  
19 Reich and Achvarina (2004) report that from their dataset of 61 intra-state conflicts where 
child soldiers could possibly be used, 26 had for certain applied children extensively, 
while 7 had not applied any at all, and the rest only to a small degree. Some of their cases 
are possibly misclassified, such as the one from in Ethiopia. They claim that in the last 
civil war children were only used to a minor extent, where children were probably exten-
sively used. Some experts believe otherwise. I have been told that the average age of the 
victories rebel army when it marched into Addis Ababa in 1991 was 17 years. Demobili-
sation data about the age distribution exist, but are not as far as I know yet public.  
20 The simplest answer would be that the variation is due to defects in the data collection. 
For example, there might have been different incentives for soldiers to register as children 
or adults in the different demobilisations that have followed in the wake of the conflicts. 
Many of the data on child soldier ratios are collected from demobilisations. Here I cannot 
dig deeply enough into the data collection processes to really scrutinize this possibility, 
and I will disregard it in most of the following. Nevertheless, after having discussed most 
of the other possibilities, it re-emerges as the most plausible explanation. 
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One such possibility is the rough economics hypothesis that a substantial 
variation in the number of child soldiers could be ’caused’ (or rather charac-
terised ) by a steep supply curve child soldiers. This could be the case for 
example if the supply of child or adult soldiering from the households were 
close substitutes. Hence a small shift in relative rewards might cause a steep 
increase in the number of children employed. Moreover a positive shift in 
demand due to the exigencies of war may cause a substantial increase in 
numbers. Commanders views regarding the ethics of employing children 
may work the same way. These possibilities can be illustrate in a simple 
(partial) supply –demand diagram:  
 
Figure 1: Case of steep supply of child soldiers 
On the vertical axis we have the number of child soldiers, in the horizontal 
axis the rewards the children expect to receive by joining,. The rewards may 
either be economic or a mixture or a mixture of economic or non-
economic.21 If no forced recruitment takes places a new equilibrium number 
of children move from A to B. 
Alternatively we might have steep demand curves, as drawn in figure 2. 
One way to legitimise that would be to have if mainly determined by the 
military situation, hence being fairly insensitive to costs. Another would be 
to assume that child and adult soldiering has a high elasticity of substitution 
in the conflicts considered. We will return to the matter when discussing the 
children’s capabilities. 
 
                                                     
21 To draw it this way some of the rewards the children get must represent costs for the or-
ganizations. This is obviously case when the organizations contribute income or finance 
their consumption baskets. In the imagined case with purely ideological motivation, both 
demand and supply should increase with increasing ‘rewards’.  
# of children
reward
A
B
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Figure 2: Steep demand curve for child soldiers 
# of children
reward
B
A
The shift in supply may then be explained when we consider that child sol-
diering is an ethically sensitive issue in most circumstances. Hence, variation 
in whether the communities find the use of children in violent tasks ethically 
justifiable or not, may cause shifts in the supply.  
The cases of steep demand or supply curves are just a way to get a brief 
overview of alternative directions in which we may look for explanations 
when we are looking partially at the ‘market‘ for child soldiering, assuming 
that it clears. To gain any insight we have, of course, to dig further into fac-
tors that may explain the forces working at the demand and supply side, not 
only look at the children in isolation, and we would have to look a the causes 
and consequences of forced recruitment.. 
An obvious way to structure the discussion is to look at the characteristics 
of 1) the area in which the children are recruited, 2) the characteristics of the 
violent organizations involved 3) their mutual competition (asymmetric or 
symmetric force levels, the scale of the military operations) and 4) the modes 
of interaction between the organizations and the recruitment areas, including 
their recruitment methods. In the following 1) and 2) will be emphasized 
while 3) and 4) will only be briefly analysed.  
6. ‘Supply’ of child soldiers in the short run  
Since the use of force is an important method in the recruitment of child sol-
diers, the notion of supply may sometimes only have meaning in a meta-
phorical sense. Nevertheless, it makes sense to distinguish between the con-
siderations the leadership of a violent organization is making when deciding 
upon their forced recruitment activities, as part of their ‘demand’ for child 
soldiers, and the characteristics of the population and area in which it oper-
ates, as causing the ‘supply’. These supply factors make it more or less 
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costly or difficult to recruit by force. The choice of recruitment method may 
also influence the quality of the recruits including their age.  
Since a large share of child soldiers are recruited by force, we will also 
look at factors in the conflict area that may determine the ease by which 
children may be caught compared to the adults, but we will first look at vol-
untary supply of child soldiers vs. their forced recruitment. Within the cate-
gory of voluntary supply we should distinguish between economically moti-
vated and ideologically (identity, politically) motivated supply. 
 
Supply characteristics of forced recruitment. The analogy of fishing and 
fishing grounds may prove helpful: The density of fish may be uneven 
across fishing grounds; the different species and sub-species may be more or 
less easy to catch, that easiness may vary across grounds, be influenced by 
the interaction of the species, the efficiency of the equipment, and so on. 
While both children and adults may be recruited by force, as stated before, I 
expect children in general to be more easy to catch due to their lower mobil-
ity and other child characteristics whatever the nature of the catchment area. 
The ‘sub-species’ of orphaned children appear for some unclear reasons eas-
ier and children with secondary education more difficult to catch than the 
child average.22 How much easier may vary across grounds.  
In certain situations children who attend a secondary school may be col-
lected in one sweep yielding increasing return, while the adults may be 
spread out working on their fields.23 Other good fishing grounds are refugee 
camps where the organization either has easy access or effective control. 
Here we expect both adults and children to be easy to collect.24 On the other 
hand, if the camps are effectively controlled by an international organization, 
refugee camps become very bad fishing grounds.  
In general we will expect that military organizations use more forced re-
cruitment (that is abductions not drafts) when recruiting in areas in which 
they have no control and far away from its base areas. Again because of 
lower mobility, children would be relatively more exposed.  
If potential recruits are located in a rural village that has become sur-
rounded by the forces of the organization, adults and children may be about 
equally difficult to catch. The existence of a nearby forest may make it more 
difficult to collect both children and adults – when the organization is in con-
trol. If not, it may be the other way around, since it makes it easier for mem-
ber of the violent organization to hide. And so we could go on.  
Not all recruitment is forced, however. While the data about child sol-
diers will not allow any definite opinion, it appears that the majority of child 
soldiers arrive by either their own or their families’ choice. The Renamo 
                                                     
22 Data reported in Weinstein (2005) indicate that Renamo recruited 90% of its soldiers by 
force, and had very high fraction of child soldiers with exceptionally low education levels. 
23 Richards (1996) notes some cases where children were collected that way in Sierra Leone. 
Becker (2004) reports that many children did not dare to attend secondary schools in Sri 
Lanka during a peace period in order not to be reenlisted. This possibility may explain 
why the school attendance drops so steeply in many of the relevant conflict areas. While 
not randomly drawn, it may be telling that about half of the recruited children in Congo 
(ILO/IPEC, 2003: 55) had been living without any parent while only a quarter of the non-
recruited control group did so.  
24 It is then surprising that Reich and Achvarina (2004) find refugee camps where the violent 
organizations have access to be the most significant factor in explaining high child soldier 
ratios. 
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case of 90% forced recruitment (if true) is probably an exception. In the 
study of the child soldiers from the Central African countries 64% told that 
they joined voluntarily while 36% had been forced (ILO/IPEC (2003: 26). 
Partly different mechanisms may determine voluntary supply and forced re-
cruitment. The following figure gives an overview of some of the major pos-
sibilities:  
 
Figure 3: Soldier supply mechanisms  
 
 
 
 
Children     Adults 
 
 
Forced   Voluntary      Forced     Voluntary 
 
Catching  economic  non-economic  Catching    economic   non-economic 
characteristics        characteristics  
 
 
Voluntary, economically-motivated supply. As mentioned, we expect that in 
areas where families employ their children extensively in their regular eco-
nomic activities they will also be more willing to let their children join mili-
tary units, but the family way of organizing also create spill-over effects be-
tween the adult and child supply of soldiering that may make the guardians 
less willing to let their children go.  
Child soldiering vs. child farming – Assume that an economically mo-
tivated adult joins a violent organization and expects to receive higher in-
come as a soldier, which he normally shares with his family. The income 
effect here will tend to increase the children’s leisure (if that is a normal 
good) or time spent only on schooling. The adult is obviously less able to 
farm as a soldier. Hence, if adult labour and child labour on the farm are 
complementary, that is, if the marginal productivity of child labour goes 
down when less adult labour is spent, the child will spend even less time on 
the farm. The effects on child soldiering will probably negative, but weaker 
than if child and adult farm work are substitutes. The disappearance of the 
adult will in this case induces more child work on the farm: The alternative 
cost of child soldiering increases at the same time as the income effects from 
the adult soldiers also reduce the incentive. The incentive to become a child 
soldier is clearly reduced. Child and adult soldiering become substitutes. The 
case of a well-paid mercenary who obediently sends his salary back home, is 
fairly rare, to put it mildly, but useful as a conceptual experiment.. More 
common may be the forced recruitment of an adult who is unable or unwill-
ing to send any income back home. If child and adult farm labour are substi-
tutes the effect on child soldiering will be indefinite since the income and 
farm productivity effects are working in opposite directions. If child and 
adult labour are complementary, however, the effects will both work in the 
direction of increasing the push towards child soldiering.  
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What are the facts? Scattered evidence (see for example Ainsworth, 
1996) suggests that technical complementary between adult and child labour 
is surprisingly in evidence in child fostering even when it is not to be ex-
pected for fairly old children. As already suggested during the discussion of 
the definition of a child, theoretical considerations will tend us to believe 
that while the labour of young children should be complementary to adult 
labour,25 older children’s work should be substitutes. If so, forced recruit-
ment of non-paid adult soldiers should induce particularly the supply of 
young child soldiers since they can not work on the farm on their own.  
The economic effects of the war itself on the income of farmers are likely 
to have strong effects on the voluntary, economically motivated supply of 
both child and adult soldiers. Sometimes the war may increase the value of 
farm products and increase the supply of both adult and child farm labour, 
and therefore also decrease the voluntary supply of soldiers. In most cases, 
however, the war has negative effects on income and may disrupt produc-
tion. When the effects of random taxation (or looting) of the war also are 
taken into account, the expected income of soldiering compared to farming 
increases and both the supply of economically motivated child and adult sol-
diering should increase. Since the average income is also likely to be re-
duced under the circumstances, and with altruistic parents, the supply of 
child soldiers would have to increase more steeply.  
 Rough considerations of the empirical realism of the different situations 
outlined here make me expect economically motivated supply of child and 
adult soldiers to move in the same direction ( and therefore the child/adult 
fraction to be indeterminate) in the empirically more likely cases above. 
 That is, if we disregard the effects of uneven landownership. A number 
of studies have shown that in rural areas with widely different family struc-
tures, such as in Pakistan and Ghana (Bhalotra and Heady, 2003) children 
with guardians who manage larger farms also supply more labour on the 
farm. Hence, the alternative cost of sending children into fighting, are higher 
for the somewhat richer parents. In addition comes the income effect so we 
will expect child soldiers, if voluntarily supplied, will come from land (and 
income) poor families. At this point of research where we mainly explore 
possibilities, the exact way the adult and child supply interacts does not mat-
ter so much, however, but it is of interest that such interaction is likely to be 
so strong that the economically motivated supply of child soldiers should be 
studied together with the supply of adult warriors.  
 
When we bring landownership into consideration, new and more realistic 
possibilities arise that the supply of child and adult soldiers may move in 
opposite directions. For example, in areas of land scarcity children – against 
established traditions – may not get access to sufficient plots of land, they 
become ‘idling’ (Biggeri et al, 2003). When a war arises, children may go 
into soldiering while the adults have an additional incentive to stay put in 
                                                     
25 The reason for this expectation is simply that at least younger children will need adult 
management for many of the relevant tasks. 
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order to keep control of land. War may make their land more easily contest-
able.26  
Youth unemployment in the cities should have similar effects as land 
scarcity, although here we may have less close interaction between the sup-
ply of child and adult soldiering. Areas where many families cannot afford 
their children to go to school, and areas where the school infrastructure is 
less well developed should also have a higher propensity to supply. Hence 
the size of the stock of so-called idle children, particularly the male one, 
should increase the propensity to supply. A group of idle children that ap-
pears to have an exceptionally high propensity to join are children in disor-
ganized refugee camps.27 
At the individual level I will expect children who have to fend for them-
selves either because of deaths of their guardians or broken family structures 
as more likely to be attracted by violent organizations, particularly when 
they supply regular family-like consumption services. In particular, it is well 
documented that violent conflicts inside the family has a strong push effect 
on the child to migrate out (Iversen, 2002). If there are systematic differ-
ences between areas in these respects, their supply rate of child soldiers 
should also differ.  
A strong pull effect on children to move out is the number of friends al-
ready migrated (V. Iversen, 2002). Hence, we may expect that the number of 
children already recruited in the neighbourhood by the armed forces will 
increase the present voluntary supply of children. Several verbal accounts 
from Sierra Leone note how this network creation may have been stimulated 
by local commanders.  
The length and intensity of the conflict in the area may also increase the 
economic motivation of both the children and their families. Increased length 
will reduce the economic values of regular alternatives, increase the death 
risks of staying civilian28 and make the knowledge of military skills a long-
time economic asset. It will disrupt families and increase the number of chil-
dren who need to fend for themselves. At the more positive end, networks 
between children and members of the violent organisation will develop, and 
lead to the same result: An increase in the voluntary supply.29 On the other 
                                                     
26 In many areas of Africa individual rights to land are often at the same time conditional on 
group rights. Hence, collective actions such as wars should be more easy to organize 
without such links between individual and group ownership. Moreover, the individual 
ownership may be contested by collective decisions. Under conflicts the incentive to stay 
on contestable land increases (as well as the incentives to frighten off or kill the owners 
increase under such rules. André and Platteau (1998) document the extremely antagonistic 
relationships that may arise across generations. During their study of the dynamics of 
landownership in a Hutu village in Rwanda, the 1994 massacre occurred. Several of the 
youth in the village used the occasion to kill some older, mostly male landowners, al-
though they were all Hutu. 
27 Such refugee camps are probably more important for the recruitment of child soldiers as 
good fishing grounds for forced recruitment of children. The case of these camps indicates 
that it is difficult to tell in any particular case without fine-grained local knowledge 
whether a high number of child soldier is caused by forced recruitment or voluntary sup-
ply. Area properties that stimulate voluntary supply also tend to make for the easy catch. 
28 Empirical studies of the death risks in different conflicts indicate that the objective risks 
are much higher when joining a military organization than when staying outside (refer-
ence?). Nevertheless, having joined and received a weapon, the individual may feel more 
secure, and the perceived risks of remaining civilian may be higher, much like the fears of 
flying may be more intense compared to own driving (cf. Kuran and Sunstein, 1999). 
29 The ILO/IPEC Central Africa study (2003) observes: “Among all the factors that influ-
ence the child’s decision to join, mixing with members of an armed group seems the most 
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hand the stock of potential recruits may dry up in a faster rate as they gain 
violent employment or is reduced through out-migration. Hence, we may not 
always observe any increase in voluntary supply in absolute numbers. In any 
case this dynamics should cause an increase the child soldier ratio since the 
stock of potential adult recruits should dry out faster. The effect may induce 
the military organization to turn to forced recruitment where, as noted, other 
considerations may determine the choice.  
At the individual level, the age of the child is, of course, the strongest ex-
planatory variable, but not likely to be of equally important at the area level 
except when the risky age cohorts constitute exceptionally high shares of the 
population.30 Older children are more likely to volunteer and to be consid-
ered responsible for their own economic survival. 
Estimates of the economic (but therefore also the expected) military suc-
cess rate of the organization to join will have to be gauged. When joining, 
the economic rewards for its ordinary members, the ease of promotion, 
harshness of discipline, the difficulty in exiting, etc. have to be considered. 
Declining military success weakens the economic incentives to enter and 
increases the ones to exit, which is one of the reasons why collective action 
problems are so severe in commercially motivate armed groups. 
The supply of ideologically motivated child soldiers31 would be influ-
enced by some of the same factors as the economically motivated ones, such 
as the existence of networks into the armed forces, friendship with soldiers 
and so on. The increase in numbers stimulated by a violent conflict itself will 
work in the same direction, but more through motives of revenge than pov-
erty.32 Many of the grievances are economic, however, and it may be diffi-
cult to tell whether a child joins in order to further its own economic interest 
or its group’s interest – in case they win. Nevertheless, its family and itself 
will normally share the grievance or ideological concerns so in the case of 
grievance motivation we should expect the child and adult supply to be 
complementary: Increased voluntary supply of adults should increase the 
supply of children who want to join, as we will see in the Mindanao case. It 
is possible that the actual number of children may decrease, however, since 
adults may block the entry of children out of altruism. The specifics of the 
ideology may become important for determining the access and the number 
children of the violent organization.33  
                                                     
important. This was not specifically included in the questionnaire, but an analysis of the 
testimonies reveals that a large number of children decided to join an armed group after 
being in contact with its members (ibid: 35).” This effect presupposes that the military 
group has some local support and not representing a hostile military occupation. 
30 Urdal (2004) finds support for the proposition that youth ‘bulges’ increase the likelihood 
of violent conflicts. Presumably, a number of youth s and younger children should join 
the violent organizations if direct effects of a youth bulge are to be found. Urdal makes 
the interesting observation that the opportunity to migrate acts a safety valve. 
31 Recently Guichaoua (2006) having studied some Nigerian violent organizations, has ar-
gued convincingly that the dualistic motive structure applied here is somewhat simplistic 
and that fear plays a more important role for recruitment than accounted for here. His 
cases are also more urban-based than the ones I have discussed.  
32 Ten per cent of the children in the ILO/IPEC (2003) survey told that revenge was their 
main motive for joining. The overall importance of having war in the neighbourhood for 
voluntary and forced recruitment of children combined is illustrated by the fact that 
among the Central African children who had been recruited, almost eighty per cent had 
experienced combat in their neighbourhoods while only twenty per cent of the control 
group – who had never been recruited – had experienced the same (ibid.).  
33 The use of children by Iran in the Iraq-Iran war is a famous case that illustrates the point. 
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7. Violent organizations tactical aims and their demand for 
children 
The guiding aims of violent organizations (not necessarily its professed 
ones) are of course important for its behaviour, including its reasons for re-
cruiting children and their ways of treating them. The relevant aims may be 
classified in different ways. We may, for example distinguish between the 
strategic, or long-run, and tactical or short run aims of the organization, 
which may be combined in different ways. One possible classification is the 
following: 
 
Table 2. Strategic and tactical aims of violent organizations 
 
Strategic 
Tactical 
Commercial 
(Greed) 
Political 
(Grievance) 
Pleasure of fight-
ing (religious) 
Win contests    
Avoid detection    
Detect enemy    
 
I will return to the strategic greed and grievance aims. Since I will not study 
the third ‘strategic’ aim any further, let me just in passing mention that it 
intends to cover the religious mystical (as the LRA in Uganda, Veale and 
Stavrou, 2003, 27), and the expressive violent (as some groups in Sierra 
Leone are believed to be).34  
The points here is that the different tactical aims may be combined with 
most of the strategic aims. The usefulness of children may differ according 
to the effective mix of strategic and tactical aims of the organization. Let us 
look at the tactical aim of winning a contest. This will obviously be a rele-
vant tactical aim for any strategic aim.35 The study of the behavioural conse-
quences of the aim reflected in so-called contest functions has received large 
attention in the analytical literature (Hirshleifer, 2000). The idea is that each 
contestant’s probability of winning reflects the share the organization spends 
in the contest compared to the aggregate resources spent by all contestants.  
Since every organization operates under some form of financial con-
straint, the organization should only substitute children for adults if they are 
cost-effective. A key assumption here is, of course, that children and adults 
are substitutes. The single theoretical discussion of the recruitment of child 
soldiers I am aware of is Gates (2004) who develops this idea by means of a 
principal agent model.36 Put simply, agents of a military organization (that is 
                                                     
34 This motivation may become rather perverse, but it is a reality that military fighting might 
be experienced as exciting, particularly when the most likely alternatives are either boring 
idleness or drudgery. In the well-known Viking heaven, Valhalla, the chosen men would 
fight the whole day while their wounds and pain were healed during the night. When 
asked why they became soldiers 15 % of the children selected for interviews in DRC, 
Congo and Rwanda who had joined one of their violent organization, told that fascination 
with the military was their main reason (ILO/IPEC, 2003: 29).   
35 Regarding a complete war as a contest, it is essential for most politically motivated or-
ganizations to win such contests, but while it may also be more lucrative for economically 
motivated organizations to win whole wars (and government power, cf. Mehlum and 
Moene, 2006) it is less essential.  
36 A principal agent model constructs a form of micro foundation for a contest success func-
tion. 
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soldiers) when recruited on a voluntary basis, have to receive sufficient util-
ity by joining that they don’t run away ( the participation restraint). Further-
more the leadership must be able to find a way to reward the soldiers so that 
they choose to act in a way that will produce the maximum increase of the 
probability of winning with the lowest financial costs (incentive compatibil-
ity constraint). Hence the leadership may employ children if they are suffi-
ciently cheap to compensate for their (potentially) lower military efficiency. 
This might happen either because the children’s alternative outside is suf-
ficiently bad so they will accept a lower compensation in order to join (and 
stay) or they are easier to monitor so less resources are needed (including the 
positive economic rewards) for them not to shirk. The model is easier to in-
terpret if we assume the children to be decision-makers themselves, although 
it possible to let them be family-controlled when determining their participa-
tion constraints. It is difficult to see how the model may handle recruitment 
by force, however.  
The predictions of the model appear reasonable: i) more children will be 
recruited if their military efficiency increases relative to the adults’, ii) if the 
children’s income possibilities outside the organization decline compared to 
the adults’ outside possibilities, (for example, increasing land scarcity may 
block the children’s access to land while adults may remain holding the 
land37 ), or if for some reason iii) the relative cost of monitoring children 
compared to adult decreases. This will happen, for example, if the fighting is 
moving further away from the soldier’s homestead, since children have 
lower geographical mobility. The difference will naturally be larger for 
younger children. Moreover, if child soldiers are added to a contest function, 
they are by implication (when properly weighed for their lower efficiency) 
perfect substitutes for adults. Hence, a wide variation in its adult/child com-
position would not be surprising, for example caused by shifts in their re-
spective participation restraints. 
More recently some dissatisfaction with contest functions has been ex-
pressed, however. If the major aim of violent organizations is to win con-
tests, why are many rebel organizations so small that they are likely to win 
only the smallest local ones? This observation have made some students (e.g. 
Fearon, 2005, Weinstein, 2005) to propose the different tactical aims in 
asymmetric warfare of avoiding detection /detect the enemy as the guiding 
ones. Fearon (2005) in particular has used the idea that it is much easier to 
detect a large than a small organization to explain the small scale of most 
rebel organizations. It is also a striking, stylised fact that rebel organizations 
apply much more child soldiers than the larger government organizations.38 
Will an organization who employ many children be more difficult to detect? 
It is difficult to see, however, that the use of children as such makes any dif-
                                                     
37 Cf André and Platteau (1998) who happened to collect land tenure data from a Hutu vil-
lage just before the genocide, could demonstrate that adolescents were receiving very lit-
tle land (against established traditions) while older land-holding males were over-
represented among the villagers killed. Richards (1996) also notes that an important rea-
son for the recruitment of youths to rebel organizations in Sierra Leone was their lack of 
access to land (although absolute scarcity of land was less pronounced than in Rwanda). 
38 This has often been explained by the fact that governments are more strongly exposed to 
international political pressure, which is, of course a contributing factor. Governments 
are, however, also, using their own small-scale organizations, militias, that also frequently 
use child soldiers extensively. They are also in other ways allowed to violate international 
norms about warfare.  
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ference, although children are often, according to considerable anecdotal 
evidence used in the collection of evidence (i.e. as spies) and as messengers 
(cf. the origin of the Boy Scout organization in the Boer war). It is also pos-
sible that simulation of the prevalent family ways of organizing, as they have 
both adult, boy and girl soldiers, may give rebel organizations an informa-
tional edge, making it easier to hide in rural populations. I have not found 
this argument made in the descriptive literature, however. 
8. Greed vs. grievance motivation and the welfare of child 
soldiers  
A dominant theme in conflict research the last decade or so has been the role 
of economic factors in causing violent conflicts. The ease by which rebel-
lions may be organized and financed has been emphasized and appeared to 
have had the strongest explanatory power in n-country regression research 
into the causes of the rise of violent (non-government) organizations. This 
empirical result combined with a growth of a large number of interesting 
economic models that study the economic aspects of violent organizations 
have led many researchers to doubt their professed political grievances as a 
cause for many of the violent organizations and impute some greed motives 
to them instead. As pointed out in Collier et al (2003) grievances may, how-
ever, have easier outlet in other forms of organizations than violent ones.  
But even if a violent organization would not have come into being with-
out access to finance (such as diamonds) it does not imply that it is without 
interest whether its real strategic aim is to improve its members’ (or leader-
ship’s) economic well-being directly (greed) or not. That is, if the major aim 
is to bring about an expected general increase of well-being of the popula-
tion due to its gaining political power, i.e. the aim is an ideological-political 
one. The individual sacrifices would then expect to be larger than the final 
individual gain, so some form of altruism is implied.  
While some of the data are anecdotal, a number of qualitative data sug-
gests that a greed organization often behaves quite differently from a griev-
ance one. It is not always easy to distinguish sharply between them one the 
basis of quantitative observations since the relevant clues are not normally 
recorded. They will appear quite similar since most economically and ideo-
logically motivated violent organizations will fight in similar surroundings, 
sometimes killing civilians, engaging in the “stalemated guerrilla war” as 
analysed by Fearon (2005). Poverty will be a motive for joining in either 
case. Why then distinguish between them?  
Humpreys and Weinstein (2004, 2005) have made a systematic quantita-
tive, investigation of a number of violent organizations in Sierra Leone that 
documents that the organizations working closer to the commercial end of 
the spectrum in the civil wars of the 1990s also behaved in a systematically 
different manner than the ones with non-commercial aims.39 They found that 
                                                     
39 In this case it might be misleading to designate the non-commercial organizations as ideo-
logical. They were more oriented towards defending local security. While the commercial 
organizations may expected to have many shared characteristics the behaviour of what I 
have termed ideological should vary more both because they may not be strictly ideologi-
cal; and if ideological, the nature of the ideology may differ substantially ranging from 
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violent (sub-)organizations that were “more ethically fragmented, use mate-
rial incentives, have weak social capital and lack mechanisms for punishing 
indiscipline” (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2005:1) also performed higher 
levels of abuse of civilians and killed more of them.40 
Does this observation have any relevance to research about child soldier-
ing? – While their research is based on a systematic study of a sample of ex-
combatants in Sierra Leone, we may observe some analogous pattern in the 
treatment of child soldiers based on two of the more reliable studies of child 
soldier experiences available. One surveys child soldiers in an Islamist guer-
rilla in Mindanao in the Philippines (Cagoco-Guiam, 2002), the other a 
number of violent organizations in Central Africa with respondents from 
Congo, DRC, Burundi and Rwanda (ILO/IPEC, 2003). 
Among the child soldiers from three of the Central African countries 
(Congo, DRC and Rwanda) the largest group answered that economic rea-
sons were ones they had for joining, 34 %, while only 21% indicated ideo-
logical reasons as the main driver. Among the Islamist child soldiers from 
the Philippines, on the other hand, 90 % told about ideological reasons while 
none mentioned material needs. Another interesting contrast is that while 5% 
of the Filipino children told that being together with their father was an in-
centive for joining, 11% of the Central African children told that they joined 
in order to leave their families. 
Furthermore, while the study on Central Africa did not ask in systematic 
way about the punishment the children were exposed to in case they dis-
obeyed, a regime of harsh punishment and fear among the children evidently 
prevailed. Fear was both a cause for staying as well for joining.41 When the 
children from Mindanao, on the other hand were asked what happened if 
they did not follow orders, 62% told that nothing would happen. Their par-
ticipation was voluntary. The atmosphere appears strikingly different as does 
the welfare of the children who joined. 
Since the children who joined the Mindanao movement could stay in 
their home area most of the time, they did not lose the contact with their 
family and could also even (with some interruptions) continue their studies 
at school. The data referred to above is about the motivation of the children, 
not the motives of the leadership of the organizations, however. In this case 
anecdotal evidence indicates that also the leaderships of the organizations in 
Central African countries have been at the commercial while the Islamist 
rebel movement in Mindanao have been at the ideological end of the spec-
trum. 
                                                     
well-controlled Marxist and Islamist groups in the Philippines to the violent religious 
mysticism of Kony’s Lord Resistance Army in Northern Uganda. 
40 Hovil and Werker (2005) describe a failed rebellion and ascribe an excessive use of vio-
lence directed against civilians by the rebel organization as being related to economic mo-
tivation. In this case it was the need to signal efforts to an external sponsor that stimulated 
a seemingly non-rational use of violence. The assertion about higher level of violence 
noted among commercial organizations applies only in the context of guerrilla wars where 
the civilians are part of its constituency. There are exceptions such as Iraq. Specific ide-
ologies may, of course, even stimulate the killing of non-constituent civilians beyond the 
point done by any commercial organization.  
41 Nine percent joined because of fear. When the author asked one of the scientific advisors 
of the ILO/IPEC study from Central Africa, Jon Pedersen (March 7, 2006) why they had 
not asked their child soldiers (ex- and present) about what kind of punishment they had 
received when they were disobedient, he told that it made no point since it was common 
knowledge that disobedience implied death (hence no one to ask ).  
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Not all difference in child welfare should be ascribed to the strategic 
commercial vs. non-commercial motivation of the leadership in the violent 
organizations. Organizations that keep its violent activities more localized to 
the homestead of its members tend to treat their child soldiers better (cf. the 
Mindanao and possibly the Sierra Leone case). 
Sanín (2006) by contrasting the use of child soldiers in the FARC (Marx-
ist oriented, mostly ideological) and profit-oriented government-supporting 
paramilitaries points to the harsher discipline and the greater difficulty of 
exiting in the former, modifies the picture of lower child welfare in commer-
cial organizations. While FARC (possibly) is an organization for upwards 
collective mobility for poor peasants, the paramilitary is an organization for 
upwards individual mobility for poor peasant (surviving) children. The diffi-
culty of exiting FARC opens up for the application of more extensive use of 
force as an individual incentive, when joined, and lower child welfare. This 
modifies our initial hypothesis about the relationship between child welfare 
and leadership motivation based on the studies from Mindanao and Central 
Africa. 
Weinstein (2005) has been looking into the two types of leadership moti-
vation and asks how they may arise and be sustained. He points out that if a 
rebel movement initially has access to large economic endowments (easy 
looting, control of diamonds, and so on) compared to social endowments 
(shared identities, and ideology, social networks) it may drive out political 
altruism in the organization, a kind of rebellion’s natural resource curse.42 It 
is not the ambition here to explain the motivational dynamics of violent or-
ganizations as such, however, but rather to explore whether such dynamics 
may cause systematic change in the share and method of recruitment of the 
child soldiers, and their treatment over time. 
In order to do so we have to look more closely into the application of 
force as a selective incentive. A violent organization must produce violence 
as a major part of its ‘output’. When the violence apparatus is already there, 
it is tempting to apply it for other purposes. It may be used for both for re-
cruitment of soldiers and as a (negative) incentive for controlling the behav-
iour of the members after recruitment. It is selective in the sense that it is 
meted out to individuals, but it has also important spill-over effects by creat-
ing general fear either among members or the population at large. While the 
spill-over effects may reinforce the original selective effects they are obvi-
ously imprecise. The fear may make soldiers more obedient or make them 
desert.43 Fear may break resistance against recruitment or increase the efforts 
                                                     
42 Some may also do re-switching as the Palestinian PDFLP, that has gone from political to 
commercial and back to political again. Some may have a political aim in its base area 
and commercial outside (government forces of Rwanda? Zimbabwe?) The same organisa-
tion may switch aims as FARC in Columbia probably has done in some areas -, going 
from political to commercial aims.: As pointed out by Hirschman (1982) this is something 
to be expected as a regular development since altruism is difficult to sustain in the long 
run. Note also that this points to a mechanism where grievance as a cause may cause 
greed-motivated organizations. 
 
43 As pointed out in Wiles (1977: 15 - 16) to make threats of force to work there must be 
some form of restraint on physical mobility. In a military organization operating in an 
area where control is unclear or divided, it is much easier to run away than it is from a jail 
or an area under strict control. The lack of mobility of young children may make force 
more efficient in their case. The many stories about children who have to perform abhor-
rent public killing against and in front of former neighbours is obviously a way to restrain 
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of potential recruits to hide. Children may respond differently than adults 
both to forced recruitment and to the internal force spill-overs. 
A violent organization needs to consider both the effects of any given 
mix of incentives and recruitment mechanisms when choosing its child sol-
dier ratio. Greed and grievance organizations are likely to demand children 
for different reasons and to treat them differently after they have joined. 
Here we have a large number of possibilities. Some may be recorded in the 
following typology: 
 
 
 Figure 4: Violent organisations – demand mechanisms  
 
 
 
  
Economic motivation     ideological motivation  
 
 
 
forced   voluntary   forced       voluntary 
recruitment  recruitment   recruitment  recruitment 
 
 
 
children adults  children adults   children adults  children adults  
 
 
 
F I E    F I E  F I E       F I E   F I E  F I E  F I E    F I E 
 
 
Figure 4 presents two specific modes of recruitment for new members who 
may be either adults or children. The two forms of leadership motivation 
define the two main types of violent organizations. Members are kept at-
tached to the organization through three forms of incentives; force, ideologi-
cal (or intrinsic) motivation and economic incentives. The typology outlines 
a number of different configurations that may characterize their demand for 
child and adult soldiers.44 In the lowest line is given the different form of 
incentives presented to the soldiers: F stands for force incentives, I for ideo-
logical incentives and E for economic ones.  
As we have outlined in figure 4 all forms of incentives may in principle 
be present at the soldier level whatever the forms of leadership motivation. 
When force is applied in recruitment, force will, of course be one of the in-
                                                     
mobility artificially. Mutual monitoring induced by the shared negative consequences of 
desertion is a further barrier.  
44 If all combination of soldier incentives are allowed: {F, I, E, FE, FI, EI, EIF}, and con-
sider the mix of economically and ideologically motivated organization as well as the mix 
of forced and voluntary recruitment as separate cases, we should have 3 * 3 * 2 * 7 = 126 
types of violent organizations according to this classificatory scheme. While leadership 
competition may make any leader fear that force may be applied to him, it is in the nature 
of being a leader that force is an incentive to administer, not to follow. 
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centives needed to apply for the soldiers to stay, but both ideological and 
economic incentives may be applied to some degree in order to reduce the 
desertion rate. Here children and adults may possibly differ. Children are 
likely to be more easily framed and there forget more quickly that they were 
recruited by force. Hence, they may have relatively lower desertion rates 
than adults recruited by force. 
The particular cases drawn in the figure is at the left side the case of a 
violent organization where the leadership is mainly motivated by economic 
motives that recruits children by force. The children are then managed by 
force incentives. Adults, on the other hand, are mainly recruited voluntarily 
and are kept fighting for the organization motivated mainly by economic 
incentives. The second configuration drawn at the right side is only outlined 
to explore the typology. It is the probably non-existing case of an ideologi-
cally motivated organization that recruits adults by force while children join 
voluntarily. The adults are then kept obedient by a mixture of force and eco-
nomic incentives while the children are only presented with economic re-
wards. 
In the preceding discussion we have presented the possibilities in terms 
of dichotomies: child soldiers who are either economically or ideologically 
motivated, organizations that may either use force or voluntary recruitment, 
and so on. In fact, of course, soldiers’ motivation (as the organizations) may 
rather be placed along an ideology –economic spectrum. Sometimes the 
ideological and economic ones may appear jointly as when a child defend 
his own right to his homestead as part of his tribe’s control right of the land 
to which his homestead is a part. Similar considerations apply to the other 
dichotomies outlined here.  
Military activities are in the end decentralized activities where both the 
final killing and the organizational infrastructure around it needs to be im-
provised. No pre-constructed assembly lines exist. Centralized monitoring is 
difficult because of classical asymmetric information issues. The risks of 
death and molestation in battles make it rational for the individual to exit 
before the battle begins.45 If many do so, the organization will lose, and the 
remaining member will be exposed to larger risks of death. The incentive to 
exit for the individual, will increase with the number of others exiting. 
Hence, the sudden switch from collective fighting to collective exiting in 
many losing battles.  
The use economic incentives to manage a violent organization in any 
precise way is hampered by strong versions of the classical problems of 
asymmetric information, collective action and adverse selection: If recruiting 
soldiers on the basis of expected economic gain, the organization has a 
higher risk of getting a mix of members who will tend to run away before a 
battle or with any set-back of winning prospects; asymmetric information 
makes it difficult to reward efforts. Result-oriented selective rewards that 
may avoid battle desertion imply looting, a risky strategy since the organiza-
tion will lose local support. To prevent the severe collective action problem, 
the use of force to prevent desertion is obviously necessary and remains nec-
                                                     
45 That happened with quite a number of children who were recruited by Renamo in the 
refugee camps in South Africa when they were about to be sent into Mozambique to do 
actual fighting. 
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essary even when most soldiers are recruited on an ideological basis (cf. the 
FARC case as described by Sanín). When combined with a corresponding 
intrinsic motivation46 political conviction is clearly ideal to mitigate this 
classical incentive problem of military action. Then it is more precise than 
either force or economic rewards. As an incentive it motivates actions when 
motivation is needed, and it is inexpensive. By reducing the severe collective 
action problems involved in actual fighting it reduces the need of harsh 
physical punishment. 
 But as pointed out by Frey (1997) in a general context (and by Weinstein 
in the context of violent organizations) both external force and economic 
rewards may crowd out and destroy intrinsic motivation.47 The organizations 
are not able to choose their incentive mix freely. Intrinsic motivation cannot 
be either bought or forced, it is either present or not. Force and economic 
rewards may be both managed and more easily combined, however. Hence 
we may expect fairly distinct greed or grievance organizations to develop 
where greed is combined with harsh punishment to prevent disintegration. 
Selective economic incentives are expensive and most rebel organizations 
are poor even when their violence activities are the most individually remu-
nerative in the neighbourhood. Hence, their leaderships would try to keep the 
number of members who are allowed to share in the net income restricted. 
Again physical punishment is useful to restrict access, but there are also rea-
sons to expect that children are more easily kept away from sharing, that is, 
greed-motivated organizations that rely on economic incentives have more to 
gain financially by employing children.48 As indicated in figure 4 both greed 
and grievance organisations may apply force in order to recruit members; 
greed motivated leaders may recruit grievance-motivated members and 
grievance organisations greed-motivated members, but on average one 
would expect that the voluntary recruits of grievance organisations will be 
grievance-motivated and the voluntary recruits of greed organisations greed-
motivated. 
 After a while greed-based organizations may reveal themselves as such 
and will receive fewer ideologically committed recruits. The fraction which 
has to be recruited by force will tend to increase over time. While not em-
pirically well documented, I will expect that children who are recruited by 
force may have lower desertion rates than adults recruited the same way. 
This applies clearly for younger children. It is more difficult for them to de-
                                                     
46 For example under cascade-like recruitment intrinsic political convictions may be wholly 
absent and ideological incentives may be as extrinsic as any threat of punishment or 
promise of dollars. 
47 Note that intrinsic motivation where the task is to kill may develop into what may be per-
ceived as pure evilness and develop into cascades of killing. Here lack of discipline may 
open up for group behaviour where the soldiers mutually stimulate their killing beyond 
reason. Presumably youth groups may develop such behaviour more easily. Intrinsic mo-
tivation of this kind is more closely connected to the third form of strategic motivation, 
fighting as pleasure, which I have chosen not to study here.  
48 Weinstein (2005) notes that Renamo initially applied economic incentives extensively 
since they received substantial economic support from South Africa. When that support 
disappeared Renamo turned to more use of forced recruitment and to recruit children, 
some very young ones. Almost nine percent of the recorded, demobilised Renamo sol-
diers were ten years old or below. 
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sert.49 Hence, we may expect that the fraction of child soldiers in small-
scale, greed-managed violent organizations to increase over time. 
Whether we should expect it to be higher than in a grievance organization 
is not obvious, however. In some African countries the main grievances are 
actually held by the older children and youth who may have lost traditional 
access to land and marriage (Richards, 1996). Hence we may expect a large 
share of children among the grievance-motivated recruits and even among 
the commanders. In the extreme case of Mindanao where whole families are 
actively engaged, the share of children may also be quite high (but not in 
command), reflecting the demographic state of the area, but presumably the 
younger children will be kept away from the most risky tasks. 
 In either case the scale of the fighting is also likely to be important for 
the share of children to be recruited. If heavy, expensive and complex weap-
ons or the disciplined coordination of large units of soldiers are necessary, 
children are less useful. Research of child labour in general suggests that 
children have rarely been given responsibility for technically complex and 
expensive equipment. There is no reason to believe it will be otherwise in 
child soldiering.50 Furthermore, if the violent competition is a low-scale one, 
it is easier to organize consumption in the military units in the same way as 
in ordinary households, so they will include many tasks that are ordinarily 
performed by children, and will demand more children for non-combatant 
tasks.  
Another important organisational “variable” is the degree of how per-
sonal the structure is: Is the loyalty towards a superior mainly based on his 
formal position or who he is? Children may more easily adjust to the latter 
form of management, which may be one of many reasons why child soldier-
ing is mainly observed in poor countries where this management style still is 
frequent and pronounced. This is again relevant for both greed and grievance 
based organizations, but as pointed out by Weinstein (2005) violent organi-
zations with high social endowments are likely to use it to greater advantage 
and receive a higher share of voluntarily recruited children. Shepler (2004) 
describes how personal ties to commanders were important both in the re-
cruiting and management of children in Sierra Leone. Children’s need for 
security, to have someone to love and respect may be – rather perversely 
many would feel – transferred to military commanders.51 
Grievance organisations are likely to handle the collective actions better 
and therefore to rely less on force as long as the members stay strongly mo-
                                                     
49 This is also one of the reasons why housekeepers prefer young house girls to be recruited 
from distant areas. In this case they may even be hired before they are able to make any 
net economic contribution since they will then be locked in with their employer during a 
longer period before they may be able to run away. For some relevant data in connection 
with this issue, see Kielland and Sanogu (2002). 
50 Specific to child soldiering is the observation made by some Western soldiers (in Sierra 
Leone) that children are more exposed to fears of heavy equipment and heavy noise. US 
commanders therefore recommend more use of heavy helicopter gunships against child 
soldier forces than one should normally do, this not in order to kill more easily, but in or-
der to frighten them and – in the end - to kill fewer children (Singer, 2001).We should 
also not that around 18-19 years of age conscripted youths may share considerable re-
sponsibility in handling modern tanks in countries like Norway and Sweden. 
51 Here we should note that some of the apparently greed-oriented organizations also pos-
sess considerable social endowments. While related, the distinction between social versus 
economic endowments is not quite the same as grievance- versus greed-oriented organiza-
tions.  
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tivated. Children and youth tend to be at least as strongly motivated as the 
communities from where they have joined.52 The leadership would on aver-
age need to treat their members at acceptable level, including the children. In 
addition to the internal reasons it, some of the political costs of bad treatment 
and forced recruitment of children will be internalised. The strength of po-
litical motivation is fickle, however, and may quickly decline. As pointed 
out already these organizations would also need to apply extensive force in 
order to keep its collective action problems within bounds and to recruit new 
manpower.53  
9. The market for child soldiering and the child soldier ratio 
We have now looked at both the demand and supply side of child soldiering. 
Let me now return to supply and demand diagrams and look more closely at 
how the two sides may mesh. I will only look at cases where the leadership 
of the organization is profit-oriented and members either economically moti-
vated or recruited by force.54 The children’s voluntary supply (economic and 
non-economic) and the area characteristics – the ease by which they may be 
recruited by force constitutes the supply side. The organizations’ demand for 
children the demand side. 
 Given the possibility of forced recruitment as well as the indications of 
high child unemployment rates in many areas in which the violent organiza-
tions operate55, the actual number observed, and therefore also the actual 
child soldier ratio, may not be an equilibrium outcome, although that is cer-
tainly a possibility. The only model of child soldier recruitment I am aware 
of, however, (Gates, 2004) presupposes an equilibrium model although the 
supply side (the participation constraint) is only modelled in a rudimentary 
way. 
Pure excess demand situations – that is the violent organization tries to 
get more recruits than it is able to acquire of both adults and children. Here 
the supply side should determine the child/adult rate if, for some reason, the 
violent organization refrains from the use of force. In this case when recruit-
ing both adults and children the child/adult ratio will be determined by the 
voluntary supply functions. We will have to explore how the children’s and 
adults supply will be affected by distribution of landownership, stock of or-
phans56, family cohesion, poverty levels, unemployment rates within the 
                                                     
52 This is likely to be part of the reason why adolescents so frequently are employed as sui-
cide killers 
53 The present situation in Sri Lanka [2005] appears to be a case in point. Internal fighting 
among Northen and Eastern Tamils have caused the Tamil forces to lose legitimacy and 
they are now applying more force when re-recruiting children, evidently expecting a new 
outbreak of the civil war (Becker et al, 2004). That situation appears soon to arise [ July 
2006].  
54 Similar analyses could be made for grievance organizations and ideologically motivated 
recruits, spelling out political motives and feedbacks of war, but they will be of a more 
case-specific nature. 
55 In Andvig (1998) I point to several observations that indicate possibly severe child unem-
ployment in some African countries. The counting of considerable number of so-called 
idle children in Biggeri et al. (2003) supports the impression.  
56 Reich and Achvarina (2004) explore whether orphan rates have any statistically signifi-
cant effects on the child soldier ratios in African conflicts, and get a negative result. This 
is not so surprising. The orphan rates will not be relevant when there is an excess supply 
of child soldiers (maybe partly caused by orphanage). It may not have any measurable 
impact on the aggregate ratio even if all child soldiers are orphans, since the number of 
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supplying groups, and so on. In addition, the groups’ expectations about 
their welfare after joining the violent organization are important and may 
differ.  
The excess demand may be resolved through forced recruitment, how-
ever, but the organization may still be unable to get all the recruits it de-
mands (when forced recruits are not paid, the demand may increase). Then 
the child soldier ratio will additionally be influenced by the characteristics of 
the fields for hunting human beings: The number of usable children vs. 
adults in the area, how easy it is to catch a child compared to catching an 
adult, the existence of exceptionally good ‘fishing grounds’ such as refugee 
camps or secondary schools, and so on. Even in this case the perceived ex-
cess demand will be influenced by the characteristics of the organization. 
For example, a losing organization is always likely to experience excess de-
mand. 
Pure excess supply situations – Here it is the characteristics and the pol-
icy of the violent organization itself that will determine the child soldier ratio 
even in the case of voluntary supply. The leadership’s view about the desir-
able ratio will be instrumental. Let us again look at a couple of cases: 
 
1) When the violent organization only applies voluntary recruitment meth-
ods and is relying on economic incentives, excess supply means that at 
the going rates the organization may recruit as many children and adults 
as it may want at the going conditions. Hence, the leadership decides the 
number of children, adults and their ratio on the basis of the expected 
profitability of their numbers and their mix. The child/adult ratio will be 
based on cost and efficiency: The relative cost-efficiency of applying 
children along the range of tasks that the organization needs to do compa-
red to the adults would be crucial. Fighting will be only one of them.57  
  
2)  The case when the violent organization also applies forced recruitment is 
in many ways quite similar, although the term ‘excess supply’ may be 
misleading, since it might include cases of excess demand, where both 
demand and supply is constrained to voluntary recruitment, but where 
this gap may be easily closed when the violent organization applies force. 
One may of course question the use of the term ‘excess supply’ in the 
case when force is used. The idea is that the recruitment area contains so 
rich ‘fishing grounds’ that it is always able to catch the desired number of 
both adults and children and could acquire more on the same terms, the 
same catchment costs, if it so desired. Also in the case when force is a 
major instrument in recruitment, the number of children caught should be 
related to the availability of adult stocks. When the adult stocks are 
depleted, the inducement to catch children increases. Long lasting wars 
                                                     
child soldiers are so few compared to the total number of employable children. Since the 
number of orphans would be influenced by the conflict itself, we have also classical statis-
tical problem of identification, particularly so since the variance of the child-soldier ratio 
is large compared to the variance of the orphanage rate. This is reflected in their range: 
While the child soldier in their cases varies between zero to fifty per cent, the orphan rate 
varies between ten and seventeen per cent.  
57 It is this situation where the principal-agent model outlined in Scott Gates (2004) is most 
directly applicable. 
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tend to have this effect. According to Pedersen (2006) something like this 
may have happened in the long lasting war in Eritrea. 
 
The size of the organization determines its need for manpower, and may be 
restrained by either a lack of capital (weapons), a lack of manpower or by 
the nature of the war (cf. Fearon, 2005). The choice of the desired ratio will 
also in this case be determined by the cost-effectiveness of children com-
pared to adults, but the ratio is likely to be different. We have reasons to be-
lieve that the optimal child soldier ratio will be higher in forced recruitment 
situations for reasons outlined before. When deciding on how many should 
be recruited by each method, the possible interference on the cost-efficiency 
between the methods should also be considered.58 In any case, the observed 
child soldier ratio will be determined as a kind of average of the two rates.  
This does not imply that the characteristics of the area are without impor-
tance also in this case, although they may not impact the chosen ratio di-
rectly. As modelled by Fearon (2005) the low optimal scale of the violent 
organizations that operate in rural neighbourhoods are explained by these 
surroundings as well as by the nature of the war. Moreover, it is these sur-
roundings that allow excess supply to occur. Excess supply may at times 
become visible when substantial numbers of children are hanging around the 
military unit, not only of curiosity, but also signalling a desire to join. 
Summing up, I will expect on the basis of the preceding analysis that in 
most situations the child-soldier ratio is likely in the short run to be deter-
mined mainly by the policies and characteristics of the organizations, not by 
the characteristics of the areas in which they operate. In the cases when we 
have excess supply of children willing to join – a less rare situation that one 
may believe – this is obvious. In situations with excess demand, the organi-
zations will attempt to close the gap by force. Again the factors that deter-
mine the quantity of children will work mainly through the organizations’ 
policies. Moreover, the rareness of children who become child soldiers com-
pared to the total number of children in the relevant age groups reinforces 
this argument. Fluctuations in war luck may cause strong shifts in supply and 
demand for both child and adult soldiering. When losing, the demand tends 
to go up and supply down, inducing an increased propensity to apply force, 
and hence induce a seemingly erratic shift in the composition of the military 
forces towards a higher child rate.  
Hence we should not expect that the heavy economic and social variables 
in the areas of conflicts where children participate to show up with great 
strength when looking at their aggregate numbers. So far I have not found 
any firm evidence about the social composition of the child soldier forces. 
However, both theoretical considerations and a considerable amount of an-
ecdotal evidence suggest strongly that they are mainly composed of children 
with poor family backgrounds.59 Moreover, low GDP levels (and therefore 
                                                     
58 The ILO/IPEC (2003) report notes some of the impact of the mix of forced and voluntary 
recruits on the management of the organization. For example, in Burundi only the chil-
dren who had volunteered were allowed to visit home.  
59 Suicide bombing is an exception. This is a form of violent activity that have a high share 
of children or young adolescents involved, but where their social backgrounds are above 
average in terms of income and education levels . This form of violent behaviour is obvi-
ously a form of elite activity, and does not tell anything about whether the violence ob-
served has anything to do with poverty or not. 
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extensive poverty) characterize the areas where conflicts that potentially in-
volve child soldiers. Hence, the long run demand for child soldiers should be 
heavily influenced by GDP and poverty levels while the short run demand, 
the demand conditional on a conflict already taking place, may not.  
10. Child soldiering and child capabilities 
The children’s capabilities compared to the tasks available in a violent orga-
nization are important in explaining whether children are employed at all,60 
and to which tasks they are eventually allocated. As we have indicated, it is 
also relevant for the method of recruitment chosen. To lump all children be-
low eighteen together is obviously misleading in this context, since their ca-
pabilities obviously change extensively between the age of six , when the 
youngest child soldiers have observed to be recruited, and to eighteen, the 
standard international upper age limit for a child. Here I will juxtapose cas-
ual observations of, sometimes only myths about, child soldiers’ behaviour 
with experimental evidence of children in US in quiet, peaceful conditions. 
Most of the observations of child soldiering are taken from West- or Central 
Africa.61 The evidence from experiments is brought in precisely because of 
the frequent myth-like evidence about the children’s behaviour when fight-
ing. 
The standard reason for why fairly young children to a larger extent than 
before may have become involved in actual fighting is the easy availability 
of very light, cheap and easily maintained weapons with considerable fire 
power which may be of considerable effect without extensive training. This 
argument is probably correct as far as it goes62, but it does not preclude that 
children are mainly involved in regular household tasks63 or may have been 
involved in organized killings based on the use of weapons like machetes or 
spears, but then probably mainly at moments when the enemies or civilians 
were unorganised.  
Moreover, even if technical capable, the characteristics of children’s per-
ception and emotional systems, their decision-making powers, may make 
children less (or more) fit for being engaged with the set of tasks of an armed 
force than adults. For example, one of the reasons for the higher casualty rate 
                                                     
60 Normative concerns about whether children should be allowed or forced to participate in 
any armed forces, and if so, which task are also important. As pointed out in the introduc-
tion, the norms against children participating in wars as soldiers are also likely to be very 
widespread. Otherwise it would be difficult to explain why there are, after all, so few 
child soldiers even in countries where children otherwise work with adults in most lines 
of activity from an early age. 
61 The special case of the youngest children is a separate issue, since the violent organisa-
tion’s demand for them may then arise before they are likely to be any productive asset. 
Why do they sometimes do so? Capabilities matched against tasks may not then provide 
the answer. This is an intriguing question, but I will not address it here.  
62 As pointed out in Pedersen (2006) the weapons have in fact not become so much lighter, 
but the soldiers probably need less training (as individuals and as a group) to make them 
deadly efficient.  
63 I would have expected the children to get more involved in household tasks, but the child 
soldiers in Central Africa appear to deny it: While 60% claimed that they were ‘often’ and 
25% told they were ‘sometimes’ assigned frontline duties only 25% admitted that they 
‘sometimes’ did household chores, and no one did it often (ILO/IPEC, 2003: 43. On the 
other hand in at least one of the case stories the child boasts he is the only one that did 
real fighting! The children are likely to underreport their involvement in household choirs 
since they yield low prestige. 
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of children observed in Sierra Leone, was the children’s ‘fearlessness’ one 
observer claimed (Amnesty, 2000, 2). Or from DRC: “Children are daring 
because they are unaware of death” (ILO/IPEC, 2003: 26).64  
This may only be an attribute of their group behaviour, but translated to a 
hypothesis about the single child, we should expect children to show less 
risk avoidance, if this is true. Here we have some experimental observations 
of potential interest. Harbaugh et al (2001) have studied whether risk behav-
iour change systematically with age.65 Roughly, their main result is that 
children underestimate low probability risks when associated with losses, 
even if the risk of loss is fairly high. The degree of underestimation is 
somewhat higher for children than adolescents. If transferable to the widely 
different setting of child soldiers, this gives weak support for the myth – it 
may be easier for the management of a violent organization to employ chil-
dren, if they are at all capable, to its extreme high risk ventures, but it should 
for the same reason expect much higher attrition rates among children with 
the same technical competence as the adults. 
What about the collective action problem in battles that altruism may 
mitigate? If that altruism is related to an ability to internalise the situation of 
others and if it is weaker among children we may expect that it is also easier 
for a child soldier to perform cruel acts. Both sets of behaviour have been 
asserted about child soldiers, but are they based on any general behavioural 
tendencies in children? Myths arise easily in the context. 
Again there are available experimental results (linear public goods ex-
periment as reported in Harbaugh and Krause, 1999) that touch the issue. In 
this case children like adults start out by being more generous than one 
would predict on the basis of pure selfishness. Age has no influence here. 
But unlike adults their voluntary contributions don’t decline and even in-
crease with the number of repetitions. Group attachment has an increasing 
effect. If we again – by a leap of faith – allow the transfer of this result to 
child soldier situations, we may not expect children for selfish reasons to 
have a stronger tendency to run away than adults. Since the lack of altruism 
is not confirmed in the first place, cruelty may not be tied to a lack of altru-
ism in the way suggested above. 
We may find other results about behaviour of potential relevance for 
child soldiering: results about their bargaining capability, the discount factor 
as applied by children, and most importantly, the ease of framing adults 
compared to children. It will take us too far to report all here. While there are 
some differences, mostly in expected directions, the thrust of the results is 
nevertheless that the difference between child and adult behaviour is surpris-
ingly small. The obvious consequence is that after having acquired sufficient 
physical strength, children may in a technical sense substitute for adults to a 
degree that is surprising given Western attitudes to and expectations about 
childhood.  
                                                     
64 At this stage I will neither accept nor reject observations of this kind. Observations from 
Burma (Human Rights Watch, 2002) suggest initially strong feelings of fear among chil-
dren in their first violent encounters. 
65 They rely on psychological work that they claim has demonstrated that children are able 
to understand probabilities and expected value calculations. The monetary value at stake 
in the adult games, were 10 times the one in the children’s games.  
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One may question whether the results of these economics experiments, 
and the other psychological research on children’s development that we have 
not referred to here, are relevant at all: May experiments where well-off US 
children may loose toys worth 5$, tell anything about an Achole girl 
(Uganda) who daily risks her life, or may the behaviour of isolated children 
in a cool emotional state tell anything about how a group of angry and scared 
children behave when their emotional states reinforce each other? Maybe 
not, but systematic data about the specifics of child soldier behaviour is 
missing (while we have serious data about the effects of the specific experi-
ence of child soldiering on later mental states and behaviour.) And it is obvi-
ous that the managers of any armed force would need to make assessments 
of child vs. adult capabilities both in their recruitment an when allocating the 
tasks in the organisation. 
The observation that the household and farm labour of (young) children 
and adults are likely to be complementary while two adults’ unskilled labour 
in the end are substitutes, suggests that something similar must be the case in 
military contests (and standard contest functions assume it). Then we know 
that at a certain age a transition in behaviour has taken place where children 
from an economic point of view can perform adult work. 
 The breakpoint clearly depends on the nature of the tasks to be solved, 
the individual characteristics of the person in question and the kind of deci-
sions to be made. In most countries children must shoulder adult work re-
sponsibilities at an earlier age than is accepted in the OECD countries, but 
they seem often to be capable, so when may their agency arrive? Iversen 
(2005: 11) based on his research on child migration in India reaches a fairly 
clear conclusion: “boys aged 12–14 regularly made labour migration deci-
sions independently of their parents and often without the consent or even 
informing the parents about their departure.” Despite many cultural differ-
ences it is also at about this age that children may seek military employment 
on their own and solve many of the simpler military tasks independently, if 
employed. Before then we may assume that the children will have to rely on 
interaction with older soldiers to accomplish their tasks.  
11. Child soldiers, poverty and conflicts: Some conclusions 
The phenomenon of child soldiers tells a complex tale about the impact of 
poverty on conflicts. Most child soldiers are highly likely to come from poor 
families. When joining a violent organization they may either use it as an 
instrument to seek redress or as an instrument for upwards economic mobil-
ity. Poverty has obviously something to do with the decision. When recruited 
by force, poor children also appear easier to catch. It is difficult to explain 
why. Nevertheless only a small minority of children with such background 
join either voluntarily or are caught.  
Looking at the aggregate levels there appears to be a very weak relation-
ship between poverty levels and the number of child soldiers, when a con-
flict has occurred. This may be explained as the combined effect of the small 
fraction of children in these conflict societies who become soldiers, and the 
power of the demand side, the power of the violent organizations. To really 
be able to explain the variation in the use of child soldiers, we would need to 
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know more about the policies and the inner workings of these organizations. 
The poverty levels of the surrounding civil populations may play only a mi-
nor role. 
Going one further level up – or behind – poverty levels reappear as a ma-
jor cause. When explaining why the fairly low scale conflicts arise – of the 
kind that may employ children on a larger scale – and with them their violent 
organizations, broadly conceived66, poverty levels are a major explanatory 
factor whether it is mainly working through the lower efficiency of govern-
ment military organizations (Fearon, 2005) that may make children useful, 
or through the recruitment mechanisms. 
The existence of children employed in organized forms of violence is in 
one sense a deeply disturbing feature of the international society calling for 
pessimism. On the other hand, the number of child soldiers is surprisingly 
low indicating that here some widely held normative concerns may be at 
work. Based on these we may also draw an optimistic policy conclusion:  
If it is true, as I have found most plausible, that the number of child sol-
diers actually employed in a conflict is not determined by heavy social or 
economic processes in the conflict area, but rather by deliberate policy of the 
leadership or local commanders of the violent organizations themselves, that 
policy should also be fairly easy to change if it is possible to have access and 
impact to these leaderships. With high degree of substitution between adults 
and children the violent organizations are not likely to loose much so there 
should not be necessary with strong instruments to have impact. 
Hence, it should be possible to reduce the number of child soldiers sig-
nificantly without having to end the conflicts themselves. How much is 
achieved by this in normative terms hinges upon how one should consider 
the ethics of children killing and suffering compared to the ethics of adult 
killing and suffering in violent conflicts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
66 See, for example, Collier and Sambanis (2005). Here I have used poverty levels in a 
vague sense. I may mean the fraction of a population who are below an arbitrary, fixed 
poverty limit, or another word for GDP levels with an understanding that few low GDP 
level countries have so equal income distribution that they will not have a large fraction of 
people who are poor.  
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